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| RAW and Covert operations |
To a cynic like me, Indian Intelligence Operations, covert or overt sound like an oxymoron and the History of Indian Inteligence agencies since Independence has more or less proved me right. India does not have a Christopher Andrew to write on Statecraft and its liason with Espionage, Intteligence Gathering and Strategy. Having said that there have been a few books, Kao boys of the RAW, Mission RAW and the book under review, RAW A History of India's Covert Operations which plough lonely half hearted furrows in a field in which gossip exchanged over the diplomatic cocktail circuit passes off as "intel alerts" and popular press cuttings are palced in files bearing the label "Secret Confidential". And in this dismal situation any work on Indian Inteligence, covert, overt or secret is welcome and Yatish Yadav has written a competent work. However, he does not reveal much except some details about the infamous Rabindra Singh case.
Throughout the years of the Raj, the Intteligence Bureau or IB was the Agency responsible for both Internal and External espionage. At least by having one central agency, the rivalry between agencies and needless duplication of work was obviated. A development from the Thugee Department, the IB was quite successful in executing its mandate. It provided deep information on Tibet that fortified India's position in the Simla Conference of 1905, it successfully ran the Great Game with Russia, kept a vigil on the Wahabbis in the NorthWest Frontier and of course had pentrated deep into the Congress Movement, the Communist Movement and the Trade Union Movement. The reaon for its success was simple: Inteligence gathering had a clear political goal, the preservation of the Empire. With Independence, the Congress leadershipwhich neither had political vision nor the ability to shape a distinct civilizational goal for India after nearly thousand years of savagery, used the IB only to keep tabs on its internal opponents, the Communists, the family of Netaji Subash Bose, and sundry other such targets. Nehru was blissfullu unaware of China's intention in both Tibet and Askai Chin. Indian Government was unaware of the deteriorating situation on the McMohan Line and the rest is History. The purpose of establishing the RAW, Research and Analysis Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat, was to provide actionable information to the Prime MInister on India's vital National Security Interests. With a budget hidden from Parlimantary scrutiny, with untramelled access to the top political leadership, the R&W was supposed to be the eyes and ears of India abroad. Instead as Yadav points out many of the R&W agents turned out to be double agents on the pay of the CIA, like Rabindra Singh, though perhaps not to the same abysmal level.
Yatish Yadav is a patriot who does not explain or rationalize the momumental failure of Indan Inteligence. In fact he has done us a great fvour by bringing out the absolute amatuer nature of India's external operations. He says that one counter inteligence operation which was handed over to the Ministry of External Affairs during the regime of V P Singh in 1989 more than $ 100.000 dollars were spent and not one single sheet of policy recomendations came out of it (221). This is not to say that there were no patriotic agents working for the R&W. The author shows that the R&W inspite of serious operational and logistic weakness was able to break the Khalistani Extremist Movement by penetrating into various front organizations in USA and Canada and provideing information that led Julio Reberio and K P S Gill successfully challenge and exterminate the threat at the source itself. But such successes were few and far between.
The R&W was called upon to deal with three major crises in India's external environment and unfortunately it failed in all three: Bangla Desh, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. India helped Bangal Desh "liberate" itself from Pakistan. The political objective behind this policy was to create a friendly state surrounded by Indian territory so that Pakistan is weakened. paradoxically liberating Bangla Desh was a huge mistake as, with the benefit of hindsight we know now that political Islam is dominant and having cut off a revenue consuminf territory, India inadvertental strengthened Pakistan which was now free to stir trouble in India using the secular card, inflaming muslim passion against the kafir Hindus, promoting muslim identity politics and secession in Kashmir, India was not prepared for te coup that brought Mujib down on 15th August 1975, barely three years after so called Liberation. R&W was taken by surprise and Mujib, India's hopes were shattered and it has not been the same ever again. In fact India nas now the unwelcome task of weeding out Banlga Desh infiltrators who have spread all across India and are now a political issue after the CAA. The R&W did redeem itself somewhat by tracing an important fugitive who had fled to Calcutta and in an act of extra ordnary rendition had him smuggled back into Bangal Desh where the decades out death warrant was promptly executed.
In Sri Lanka, India was a total disaster and Yadav recognizes that fact but is not able to see the deeper currents. India will never accept an independent Tamil State in Sri Lnaka and the spill over into the Indian territory will fuel violent identity politics. And if Independence cannot be accepted then why did R&W under Indira Gandhi train LTTE and TULF cadres to wage unconventional war against the State in Sri Lanka. The reason again is simple: To acquire some leverage against Sri Lanka when it was seen to become close to China. This sort of Big Power Game can be played by USA and Israel. India neither has the institutional nor intellectual strenght to play this game. And India failed miserably in Sri Lanka. Once again the political objective of sending the Indian Peace Keeping Force was not clear. Was it to maintain peace or to bring Prabhakaran and the LTTE to the negotiating table. Sri Lanka, on the other hand was able to use Pakistan and China effectively and in May 2009 was succeful in getting Israeli cooperation to track down the satellite phone which was used by the leaders. India withdrew from Sri Lanka and the killing of one of India's political leaders was the direct result of this failed experiment. R&W was uable to provide ground level intelligence to the indian Army and on one ocassion when it had located Prabhakaran and reported the matter toPMO for advice, the Indian Army was ordered not to kill Prabhakaran. A costly mistake.
The most serious issue before India from 1979 when the then Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, was the question of India's role in that landlocked country. Though India was not happy with the invasion. it thought it prudent to keep quiet. And thus left the field open for the CIA. The Americans sent in some $ US 15 billion dollars in military aid to the country through Pakistan. And the high level of sectarian violence is the result of the American encouragement to jihad which culminated in the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York city. Now as the Americans prepare to leave India does not have groups to support Indian interests there and the carnage of indigenus people in Afghanistan by ISIS groups (incidentally recruited from Malapuram, Kerala) demonstrates clearly that India has lost the game. The R&W has cultivated some assets in the Baluchi Moveent but it would have been better had Pakhtunistan Independence been encouraged as that would essentially weaken Pakistan considerably.
The book is an interesting read and anyone who wants to know abut Indian intelligence operations will rrofit by reading this book.
