A look at the world of politics, statecraft, diplomacy and books
1809 should have been an easy year for the Madras Presidency. The struggle against the Mysore usurper had ended with his death in 1799. Tipu Sultan's sons and the rest of the family despatched to Calcutta after the Vellore Mutiny of 1806. The Maharatas were quiet after a long time and the Nizam and the State of Travancore safely bound to the Company by the Subsidiary Alliance. With the death of Lord Cornwallis in Gazipur, Sir George Barlow was appointed as the Governor General as he was the senior most member of the Governor General's Council,an appointment turned down by the Court of Directors in London in favor of Lord Minto who reached Calcutta in 1807 and as a sop Sir George Barlow was sent to Madras as the Governor of the Presidency. But things turned out different. Madras Presidency, mere three years after the Vellore Mutiny was torn by a military revolt in which the Indian soldiers did not participate and yet more than 1000 sepoys died in the fighting and skirmishes. And not a single White Officer was punished for Mutiny under the Army Act which carried the death senstence. We may recall that Col. Rolo Gillespie had massacred more than 800 soldiers soon after he retook the Fort of Vellore. Perhaps for this reason William Dalrymple does not mention the Army Revolt in his catalogue of corporate violence and pillage in India.
The Company maintained three separate Armies in the Presidencies of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta and all of them under the Governor who was assisted in his function by a Council. This system known as Governor in Council was subordinate to the Governor General but given the distance and the divergining aims of the Company Administration--Commericial Profit to the Court of Directors and a Military and Diplomatic organization to the Government of UK--each Governor was essentially independent. The Army itself was largely composed of Sepoy Regiments which were commanded by Company Officers and the Regiments from the Kings' Army seconded for service in India by the Government. Thus the very structure of the Army contained seeds of the deadly conflict that erupted in 1809. Competition and conflict between the Company Officers and the Kings' Army Officers over pay, allowances, postings and duties both military and diplomatic were common. Even Fortescue in his celebrated History of the British Army conceded the fact that the Company Officers were better trained and intellectually well equipped due to their long years of serivice but when it came to command postiings, the Kings' Officers were preferred. Another prime ara of concern related to the disparities in pay and allowances between the Bengal Army Officers and the Madras Army Officers. Only after the Mutiny of 1857 that the differences were removed. Though Cornwallis had supported the uniformity of pay an early mnifstation of "one rank one pay" the Headquarters had turned it down on the specious ground that the Officers were aware of the differences and yet signed up. It is against this background of simmering tension that the 1809 Revolt erupted.
The bearded " prophet" called Karl Marx called the East India Company a "Writing Machine" and he was right. There is a huge collection of documents lying in India Office Library about the Revolt but no one since Sir John Malcolm has doe serious work. The Commander in Chief of the Madras Army, Sir John Craddock, decided to look into the finances of the Army in order to trim the flab and appointed Col John Munro (no relative of Sir Thomas Munro) to prepare a Report and make suggestions.
PART I
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| Sir George Barlow |
The Company maintained three separate Armies in the Presidencies of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta and all of them under the Governor who was assisted in his function by a Council. This system known as Governor in Council was subordinate to the Governor General but given the distance and the divergining aims of the Company Administration--Commericial Profit to the Court of Directors and a Military and Diplomatic organization to the Government of UK--each Governor was essentially independent. The Army itself was largely composed of Sepoy Regiments which were commanded by Company Officers and the Regiments from the Kings' Army seconded for service in India by the Government. Thus the very structure of the Army contained seeds of the deadly conflict that erupted in 1809. Competition and conflict between the Company Officers and the Kings' Army Officers over pay, allowances, postings and duties both military and diplomatic were common. Even Fortescue in his celebrated History of the British Army conceded the fact that the Company Officers were better trained and intellectually well equipped due to their long years of serivice but when it came to command postiings, the Kings' Officers were preferred. Another prime ara of concern related to the disparities in pay and allowances between the Bengal Army Officers and the Madras Army Officers. Only after the Mutiny of 1857 that the differences were removed. Though Cornwallis had supported the uniformity of pay an early mnifstation of "one rank one pay" the Headquarters had turned it down on the specious ground that the Officers were aware of the differences and yet signed up. It is against this background of simmering tension that the 1809 Revolt erupted.
The bearded " prophet" called Karl Marx called the East India Company a "Writing Machine" and he was right. There is a huge collection of documents lying in India Office Library about the Revolt but no one since Sir John Malcolm has doe serious work. The Commander in Chief of the Madras Army, Sir John Craddock, decided to look into the finances of the Army in order to trim the flab and appointed Col John Munro (no relative of Sir Thomas Munro) to prepare a Report and make suggestions.
To be continued in PART II
