Vellore Mutiny, July 10 1806 : A of review of Vellore Revolt, 1806

A look at the world of politics, statecraft, diplomacy and books

Vellore Revolt 1806

Dr K A Manikumar

VIT 

July 10, 1806 began like any other day in a cantonment of the East India Company. The oppressive Summer heat had yielded to some light showers and as the sun rose over Vellore on that day, the Sepoys of the Madras Army rose in revolt. They armed themselves and soon gathered in the parade ground to prepare for the attack on the Quarters of their officers. By the time the sun rose, more than 250 White Officers and their families had been killed and the handful of survivors has taken refuge in the Church in the Fort and in Cellars of buildings. They soldiers hunted them from their hiding places and slaughtered them. The savagery of the attacks was numbing. What lay behind this Revolt? 

The question has not been adequately answered as most historians were keen to establish the primacy of South India in general and the Tamil region, in particular, in embracing the cause of resistance to the rule of the East India Company and hence a precocious curtain raiser to the more spectacular Revolt of 1857. There is no doubt that the rule of the Company had torn the Moral Economy of South India and the agrarian changes particularly the resumption of land and its revenue by the Company after crushing the Polygar Uprising in 1803 had resulted in considerable distress. The caste composition of the Madras Army  essentially consisted  of Telugu warriors and peasants from the dry region of the  Peninsula, Tinnevelly, Ramnad, Madurai etc and social groups which were classified as "untouchable" particularly the "paraiah" caste. To this volatile mix was added the Palayamkottai Regiment which had taken part in the recent campaingns against Tippu Sultan in Mysore and in the expeditions against the Polygars. The presence of the deposed sons of the erstwhile ruler of Mysore in the Vellore Fort added an element of conspiracy to the entire event.

The "native" troops were seething with rage at the recent orders passed by General Craddock prohibiting the Sepoys from smearing their foreheads with "caste marks" and the leather cockade that was to be added to the turban was considered unclean. While these two grievance came to the fore in the Official Inquiry conducted by Lord William Bentinck as the Governor of Madras, more serious factors were at play. The brutal punishments inflicted on indigenous soldiers for minor infractions  was deeply resented. The Company has instituted a reign of terror to keep peace in the conquered regions and the Sepoys were flogged whipped and shot without trial or appeal. The savagery with which the Sepoys fell upon the white Officers can only be explained by deep felt resentment and hatred. 

By 9:30 the killings had stopped. The Sepoys were exhausted by their physically by the six hours of nearly non stop massacre, and having found the liquor stores of the white officers proceeded to indulge themselves, oblivious to the fact that they had even left the Main Gate of the Fort unguarded and had not noticed that at least a few White Officers and a handful of "loyal" soldiers had not been accounted for. As was the case in 1857, the soldiers lacked strategic sense and the ability to plan for the consequences.

Near Ambur, nearly 30 miles from Vellore Col Rollo Gillespie heard of the disturbances in the Fort from sepoy who had broken out of the fort. https://wordcraftandstatecraft.blogspot.com/2020/05/sir-rollo-

gillespie-and-battle-of.html. Without waiting for orders from Madras Gillespie rallied a handful of men and rode towards Vellore. He reached Vellore around four in the afternoon and chivied up the curtain wall of the Fort. With the few men at his command he managed to break into the Fort and the very sight of the Officer was enough to put the fear of God in the minds of the rebel soldiers.

The reprisal was swift and barbaric. Indian soldiers were quickly rounded up and  tied to the mouths of cannon and shot. A few of the Sepoys had taken shelter in the famous Jalakanteswara Temple, a late Vijayanagara temple located within the Fort. Till this day the walls of the inner sanctum bear the marks of the terrible battle that raged inside.

Jalakanteswara Temple

  By the time the Sun set over Vellore nearly 1500 sepoys lay dead. Col Gillespie extracted a tremendous price for the alleged disloyalty of the sepoys.  Was the Vellore Revolt an attempt at ridding India of Company Rule? Was it a vain effort to reinstall the sovereignty of the deposed Mysore usurpers? Was it a reaction to the cumulative grievances of  the Sepoys? Was it an atavistic attempt at stopping the Missionaries who were very active in the area. Historians are still debating.

The book Vellore Revolt 1806 by Dr Manikumar is an excellent introduction to these and other vexing issues surrounding the traic event that transpire on that July day in 1806.

Tatya Tope's Operation Red Lotus: History as Memory

A look at the world of politics, statecraft, diplomacy and books

Tatya Tope's Operation Red Lotus

Prayag Tope

New Delhi Rupa,2010

History is a curious discipline. As Alice in Wonderland remarked, Memory works only backwards. If only Historians have the luxury of retrofitting events that happened into a predetermined pattern, then all history will become ever so predictable. And this teleology is the most striking weakness of the so called Marxist view of History which imposes a predetermined pattern upon the past. And the book under review, though a welcome departure from the innane certainities of contemporary Historiography, attempts to rehabilitate the reputation and achievements of the great leader, Tatya Tope, during the momentous 1857 Rebellion by making his participation central to the entire History of 1857. This interpretation i of course highly exaggerated but by highlighting the contribution of Tatya Tope a long needed corrective has been introduced.

Parag Tope, obviously a descendent of the leader of 1857 has argued that Tatya Tope organised the entire Rebellion and the circulation of lotus stems and chappatis is proof of his organizational skill. The Lotus stems, he argues was circulated to Sepoy battalions all over North India in order to gauge the probable strenght of the East India Company and its discontented sepoys. And the chappatis were circulated to alert villagers about the need for preparing and stocking provisions for the rebel troops. This line of interpretation may ber plausible, but does not necessarily support the argument that recruitment, logistics and strategy were in the hands of Tatya Tope. Nana Saheb did possess immense organizational ability and a vision of Statecraft extending beyond the limits of the Mahratta Confederation. The manner in which the author has discussed the Kanpur Massacre and the Bibi Ghar incident in commendable. There is no doubt that the Sepoys unlike the English soldiers did not  believe in targetting women and children and the tragic episode was largely the result of the indiscriminate killings of civilians undertaken by General Havelock and General Neill.

Prayag Tope has brought into the discussion important aspects of the economy of India as it slid into abyss of British rule. He rightlly emphasises the "racial" and "ethnic" underpinnings of British ideology of domination which ultimately led to the treatment of Indians as sub humans and the Sepoys of North India, as did the Sepoys of Vellore fifty years earlier realised. Much has been written about Awadh and the loot of the rich province right from the time of Warren Hastings. Here the emphasis is on the deliberate and sustained attack on the traditional economy of India: Cotton and Iron. He has pointed out that the loot from India was behind the Industrial Revolution and in this Parag Tope is absolutely right. It is well known now that after the acquisition of the Diwani Rights over Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, the income of the Company by way of taxation was nearly 65 million pounds,a  sizeable percentage of the National Income of England/Britain.

The book is based on the premise that History has to fall into a pattern in order for it to be intelligible. Unfortunately the evidence of Tatya Tope presiding over an elaborate Rebel Administration which the Mughal Procalmation giving his regime a semblence of legitimacy, is thin. The letters written in Urdu on which this argument is based raises the question: whu Urdu and not Mahrathi in Modi script as was the practice during the heyday of Mahratta Supremacy in the eighteenth century, about which we are learning so much due to the stalwart effotrs of Dr. Uday Kulkarni. 

Parag Tope has rightly drawn attention to the horrendous price paid by India. The crimes of Havelock and Neill in killing people all along the infamous march from Allahabad or Prayag to Lucknow contributed to India being defeated and the Rebels lost access to food and shelter. The deliberate policy of burning village and hanging people contributed to a loss of morale and it seems that India was maimed as a consequence. And one historical fact needs to be highlighted. General Neill brought with him the Madras Fusiliers and much of the fighting was done by Tamil and Telugu speaking soldiers. This fact need not be hidded as History is an engasgment with Truth.

I enjoyed reading the book. However as History it leaves certain questions behind.

THE MADRAS ARMY IN REVOLT: THE 1809 REVOLT AND ITS SUPPRESSION PART II

A look at the world of politics, statecraft, diplomacy and books

Sir George Barlow and General Hay Macdowall

The Revolt of 1809 is a neglected episode in the history of India and since the Governor Sir George Barlow did not write either his memoirs nor commission an "authorised" biography, he has been represented only by his opponents in their writing. Chief amon whom was the famous Soldier Historian Sir John Malcolm who wrote a book in 1822 excoriating the Governor for the way in which he handled the Revolt. In truth however, Sir John Malcolm was sent by the Governor to negotiate with the rebellious Officers in Masulipattinam but failed miserably yo carry out his brief. Years later he penned his Observations on the Disturbance in the Madras Army in which he shifts the blame on the shoulders of Sir George Barlow. However the events of 1809 were far more complex than a mere clash between a vengeful Governor and a petulant Commander in Chief of the Madras Army, General Hay Macdowall,

There was trouble brewing in the Madras Army for at least a decade before the Revolt following the recoganization of the Company Forces in 1796. We have already alluded to earlier of some of the main grievances: (1) Equality of Pay between Bengal and Madras Armies (2) Continuance of the Tent Contract and (3) disparity in Command postings between Kings'Army and the Company Regiments. In normal circumstances these issues my have been resolved. But a series of miss steps involving the Governor and his Commander in Chief triggered what was essentially a conflict of supremacy between the Civilian Administration and the Military. Sir John Craddock who was the immediate predecessor of General Macdowall had instructed, Col John Munro to investigate the "Tent Contract" and offer suggestions. Acting on the directions of his superior, Col John Munro submitted a Report in which he recommended the abolition of the Tent Contract. The Report was a Confidential one and was marked only to the Commander in Chief. Perhaps the Madras Army too suffered from the same malaise of the Ministry of Defence under the Congress Regime. Interested parties would find the contents of official files before they were seen by the superiors and action taken. Munro wrote in his Report: "the grant of the same allowances in peace and war placed the interests and duties of commanding officers at variance with each other". What he stated so baldly was true and it was widelt known that the superior officers were taking a cut from the contracts handed down to native suppliers, perhaps for a consideration. The direct imputation of dishonesty added fuel to an already enraged Officer Corps. Within days this Repor was leaked. Any surprises here. None at all and a strrm of protest started brewing.

Twenty eight Officers of the Company, excluding the Kings' Officers signed a "collective memorial" demanding Col John Munro be tried before a Court Martial for impugning the "honour of the Officers"

Continued in Part III

THE MADRAS ARMY IN REVOLT: THE 1809 REVOLT AND ITS SUPPRESSION

A look at the world of politics, statecraft, diplomacy and books

PART I

Sir George Barlow

1809 should have been an easy year for the Madras Presidency. The struggle against the Mysore usurper had ended with his death in 1799. Tipu Sultan's sons and the rest of the family despatched to Calcutta after the Vellore Mutiny of 1806. The Maharatas were quiet after a long time and the Nizam and the State of Travancore safely bound to the Company by the Subsidiary Alliance. With the death of Lord Cornwallis in Gazipur, Sir George Barlow was appointed as the Governor General as he was the senior most member of the Governor General's Council,an appointment turned down by the Court of Directors in London in favor of Lord Minto who reached Calcutta in 1807 and as a sop Sir George Barlow was sent to Madras as the Governor of the Presidency. But things turned out different. Madras Presidency, mere three years after the Vellore Mutiny was torn by a military revolt in which the Indian soldiers did not participate and yet more than 1000 sepoys died in the fighting and skirmishes. And not a single White Officer was punished for Mutiny under the Army Act which carried the death senstence. We may recall that Col. Rolo Gillespie had massacred more than 800 soldiers soon after he retook the Fort of Vellore. Perhaps for this reason William Dalrymple does not mention the Army Revolt in his catalogue of corporate violence and pillage in India.

The Company maintained three separate Armies in the Presidencies of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta and all of them under the Governor who was assisted in his function by a Council. This system known as Governor in Council was subordinate to the Governor General but given the distance and the divergining aims of the Company Administration--Commericial Profit to the Court of Directors and a Military and Diplomatic organization to the Government of UK--each Governor was essentially independent. The Army itself was largely composed of Sepoy Regiments which were commanded by Company Officers and the Regiments from the Kings' Army seconded for service in India by the Government. Thus the very structure of the Army contained seeds of the deadly conflict that erupted in 1809. Competition and conflict between the Company Officers and the Kings' Army Officers over pay, allowances, postings and duties both military and diplomatic were common. Even Fortescue in his celebrated History of the British Army conceded the fact that the Company Officers were better trained and intellectually well equipped due to their long years of serivice but when it came to command postiings, the Kings' Officers were preferred. Another prime ara of concern related to the disparities in pay and allowances between the Bengal Army Officers and the Madras Army Officers. Only after the Mutiny of 1857 that the differences were removed. Though Cornwallis had supported the uniformity of pay an early mnifstation of "one rank one pay" the Headquarters had turned it down on the specious ground that the Officers were aware of the differences and yet signed up. It is against this background of simmering tension that the 1809 Revolt erupted.

The bearded " prophet" called Karl Marx called the East India Company a "Writing Machine" and he was right. There is a huge collection of documents lying in India Office Library about the Revolt but no one since Sir John Malcolm has doe serious work. The Commander in Chief of the Madras Army, Sir John Craddock, decided to look into the finances of the Army in order to trim the flab and appointed Col John Munro (no relative of Sir Thomas Munro) to prepare a Report and make suggestions.

To be continued in PART II