RAW A History of India's Covert Operations: Tiger Zinda hai?

RAW and Covert operations

A look at the world of politics, statecraft, diplomacy and books

To a cynic like me, Indian Intelligence Operations, covert or overt sound like an oxymoron and the History of Indian Inteligence agencies since Independence has more or less proved me right. India does not have a Christopher Andrew to write on Statecraft and its liason with Espionage, Intteligence Gathering and Strategy. Having said that there have been a few books, Kao boys of the RAW, Mission RAW and the book under review, RAW A History of India's Covert Operations which plough lonely half hearted furrows in a field in which gossip exchanged over the diplomatic cocktail circuit passes off as "intel alerts" and popular press cuttings are palced in files bearing the label "Secret Confidential". And in this dismal situation any work on Indian Inteligence, covert, overt or secret is welcome and Yatish Yadav has written a competent work. However, he does not reveal much except some details about the infamous Rabindra Singh case.

Throughout the years of the Raj, the Intteligence Bureau or IB was the Agency responsible for both Internal and External espionage. At least by having one central agency, the rivalry between agencies and needless duplication of work was obviated. A development from the Thugee Department, the IB was quite successful in executing its mandate. It provided deep information on Tibet that fortified India's position in the Simla Conference of 1905, it successfully ran the Great Game with Russia, kept a vigil on the Wahabbis in the NorthWest Frontier and of course had pentrated deep into the Congress Movement, the Communist Movement and the Trade Union Movement. The reaon for its success was simple: Inteligence gathering had a clear political goal, the preservation of the Empire. With Independence, the Congress leadershipwhich neither had political vision nor the ability to shape a distinct civilizational goal for India after nearly thousand years of savagery, used the IB only to keep tabs on its internal opponents, the Communists, the family of Netaji Subash Bose, and sundry other such targets.  Nehru was blissfullu unaware of China's intention in both Tibet and Askai Chin. Indian Government was unaware of the deteriorating situation on the McMohan Line and the rest is History. The purpose of establishing the RAW, Research and Analysis Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat, was to provide actionable information to the Prime MInister on India's vital National Security Interests. With a budget hidden from Parlimantary scrutiny, with untramelled access to the top political leadership, the R&W was supposed to be the eyes and ears of India abroad. Instead as Yadav points out many of the R&W agents turned out to be double agents on the pay of the CIA, like Rabindra Singh, though perhaps not to the same abysmal level. 

Yatish Yadav is a patriot who does not explain or rationalize the momumental failure of Indan Inteligence. In fact he has done us a great fvour by bringing out the absolute amatuer nature of India's external operations.  He says that one counter inteligence operation which was handed over to the Ministry of External Affairs during the regime of V P Singh  in 1989 more than $ 100.000 dollars were spent and not one single sheet of policy recomendations came out of it (221).  This is not to say that there were no patriotic agents working for the R&W. The author shows that the R&W inspite of serious operational and logistic weakness was able to break the Khalistani Extremist Movement by penetrating into various front organizations in USA and Canada and provideing information that led Julio Reberio and K P S Gill successfully challenge and exterminate the threat at the source itself. But such successes were few and far between.

The R&W was called upon to deal with three major crises in India's external environment and unfortunately it failed in all three: Bangla Desh, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. India helped Bangal Desh "liberate" itself from Pakistan. The political objective behind this policy was to create a friendly state surrounded by Indian territory so that Pakistan is weakened. paradoxically liberating Bangla Desh was a huge mistake as, with the benefit of hindsight we know now that political Islam is dominant and having cut off a revenue consuminf territory, India inadvertental strengthened Pakistan which was now free to stir trouble in India using the secular card, inflaming muslim passion against the kafir Hindus, promoting muslim identity politics and secession in Kashmir, India was not prepared for te coup that brought Mujib down on 15th August 1975, barely three years after so called Liberation. R&W was taken by surprise and Mujib, India's hopes were shattered and it has not been the same ever again. In fact India nas now the unwelcome task of weeding out Banlga Desh infiltrators who have spread all across India and are now a political issue after the CAA. The R&W did redeem itself somewhat by tracing an important fugitive who had fled to Calcutta and in an act of extra ordnary rendition had him smuggled back into Bangal Desh where the decades out death warrant was promptly executed.

In Sri Lanka, India was a total disaster and Yadav  recognizes that fact but is not able to see the deeper currents. India will never accept an independent Tamil State in Sri Lnaka and the spill over into the Indian territory will fuel violent identity politics. And if Independence cannot be accepted then why did R&W under Indira Gandhi train LTTE and TULF cadres to wage unconventional war against the State in Sri Lanka. The reason again is simple: To acquire some leverage against Sri Lanka when it was seen to become close to China. This sort of Big Power Game can be played by USA and Israel. India neither has the institutional nor intellectual strenght to play this game. And India failed miserably in Sri Lanka. Once again the political objective of sending the Indian Peace Keeping Force was not clear. Was it to maintain peace or to bring Prabhakaran and the LTTE to the negotiating table. Sri Lanka, on the other hand was able to use Pakistan and China effectively and in May 2009 was succeful in getting Israeli cooperation to track down the satellite phone which was used by the leaders. India withdrew from Sri Lanka and the killing of one of India's political leaders was the direct result of this failed experiment. R&W was uable to provide ground level intelligence to the indian Army and on one ocassion when it had located Prabhakaran and reported the matter toPMO for advice, the Indian Army was ordered not to kill Prabhakaran. A costly mistake.

The most serious issue before India from 1979 when the then Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, was the question of India's role in that landlocked country. Though India was not happy with the invasion. it thought it prudent to keep quiet. And thus left the field open for the CIA. The Americans sent in some $ US 15 billion dollars in military aid to the country through Pakistan. And the high level of sectarian violence is the result of the American encouragement to jihad which culminated in the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York city. Now as the Americans prepare to leave India does not have groups to support Indian interests there and the carnage of indigenus people in Afghanistan by ISIS groups (incidentally recruited from Malapuram, Kerala) demonstrates clearly that India has lost the game. The R&W has cultivated some assets in the Baluchi Moveent but it would have been better had Pakhtunistan Independence been encouraged as that would essentially weaken Pakistan considerably.

The book is an interesting read and anyone who wants to know abut Indian intelligence operations will rrofit by reading this book.

The Moplah Rebellion: Insurgency, Counter-insurgency and the End: Part III

The Rebel Areas

A look at the world of politics, statecraft, diplomacy and books

PART III

Like anyother riot that culminated in a huge conflagration the Moplah Outrages of 1921 had a rather unseemly, even comical beginning.  Hitchcock, the Deputy Superintendent of Police sent out a police party to arrest Vadakkevitti Muhammed, the self styled leader of the Khilafat Committee at Ernad on August 21, 1921. Police went in search of the man and getting some information that he was hiding in the Mambaram Mosque in Tirinangadi they went there. Meanwhile Ali Musseliar and his associates had spread the rumour that the Police had set the mosque on fire and this provoked a large number of Moplahs to gather and soon a huge crowd had gathered. Police had to resort to firing in which a number of people were killed.  This event was itself the culmination of more than 18 months of intense propaganda and organization in the region starting from April 1920 when the first Kilafat Committees were constituted. And in August 1920, Gandhi descended on Calicut with Shaukat Ali in tow and without understanding the fanacticism that was burning in the Moplah regions of Ernad, Walluvanad and Ponnani, Gandhi gave out the call for Non Cooperation thereby leaving the indigenous people to the tender mercies of the Moplahs. 

During the course of the next six months or even later, the indigenous people were subjected to untold misery and groups of Moplahs killed people, looted property, descecrated temples and committed gruesome atraocities on women and children. It is a pathetic feature of Indian Historiography that the victims of the Moplahs have not been given the dignity of being remembered and those who mutilated nd killed them have their names recognized as "martyrs". Perhaps the need for a political consensus after the division of India in 1947 neccesitated an approach that would relegate to amnesia the sufferings of the people and their tormentors hailed as "freedom fighter". This change in the discourse on the Moplah Rebellion was the consequence of Gandhi's misguided and as it turned out suicidal embrace of the Khilafat cause against the better judgement of the only nationalist Muslim leader the Congree ever had, M A Jinnah. Jinnah like Ambedkar had foreseen the demonic consequences of flirting with religious extrimeism. While the leaders like Ali Musseliar and Variankunnath Kunmuhhamda, Chembrasseri Tangal and others who were judged and found guily of committing crimes have memorials all over Kerala to honour them and also to sustain the political parties that derive sustenance for their deeds, the victims of the Moplah Outrages of 1921 lie forgotten. Even the sites of the worst atrocities have not been remembered or memorialized. The temples that were looted and descerated during the six moths of terror in the region lie in a dilapitated condition tll this day. We hope that 1n 2021 when the centenary of this Moplah Rebellion comes, a Memorial with the names of the victims will be constructed,

The District Magistrate of the Malabar, F E Thomas sent in a confidential Report to the Governor of Madras requesting additional police/military support and declaration of Martial Law in the three worst affected areas. The Madras Government was reluctant to comply as it felt that with Gandhi's presence and support in the Movement, the political backlash would be hard to bear. And with the Memory of Jalianwallah Bagh still fresh, the Governor and his Council declined to declare martial law. Even additional troops were hard to mobilize as demobilization after the War had kicked in. Once again it was Gandhi's lurking presence that held back the hand of the Governor and the result, of course, was large scale violence and atrocities against Hindus and in rare cases even Christians. Indeed the Sunni character of the Rebellion is underscored by the fact that even Moplah Shias were troubled during those horrible evil days. In Kondotti in Ernad a Shia "tangal" tomb was destroyed when the local Shias refused to lend support to the rebels. It is clear that Jinnah was right. Gandhi and the Congress walked into the Khilafat Agitation with their eyes wide shut. Even the Encyclopedia of Islam notes that the Moplahs have a "reputation for uninformed zealotry unparalleled on the sub continent". 

The Governor of Madras was keen to deal with the emerging tensions in the Malabar region only as a Moplah issue and refused to even use the words Non Cooperation or Kilafat as that meant dealing with the issue at hand from a different perspective. This unnecessary concession to Gandhi's perverse entry into the Moplah Rebellion resulted in the District Administration losing valuable time and the initiative passed to the Moplahs who now felt that the Government had accepted its terms. All that Madras did was to allow him to use the powers granted to the Malabar District Mgistrate to arrest persons carrying the "Malabar Knife" under the Malabar War Knives Act of 1854. This measure came too late as by  the third week of August 1921 Moplah hordes of 2000 men were forming and assembling by the beat of drums. Men wearing Khilafat badges and carrying knives collected near Kovilagam and Manjeri. 

The Police were aware that active preparation was being undertaken for large acts of violence as information had reached Hitchcock that two Hindu Ironsmits were tasked with manufacturing the knives, daggers, and spears soon after the Karachi Conference in January 1920. The iron workers later stated that they were coerced into making the weapons and thus escaped severe punishment at the hands of the military tribunal. Hirtchcock felt that he needed sufficient men to carry out search and seizure operations across the affected areas. Madras did not agree with this perfectly sound advice. The first step that any Government takes while facing an insurgency is total theatr domination. And Hitchcock and Thomas were both forced to deal with the situation from a position of relative weakness. Meanwhile the Moplahs were indulging in attacks on police stations, tarwad mansions of Nairs jemins and temple and these attacks were often accompanied with cruel acts of violence inflicted with gay abandon.

After the attack on the Police party on August 20, 1921 it was no longer possible for Madras to pretend that all was fine in the Malabar. Deparate telegrams were sent to Simla requesting the Viceroy to authorize troops from Bangalore. Valuable time had been lost and when finally the order was given that troops stationed in Bangalore would be sent out. However the Bangalore troops were not in a positio to move to the Malabar and once again the situation in the Mlabar went from bad to extremely bad. The Newspapers were reporting all the discussions going on and so the rebels must have known the quandary in which the District Administration was faced. While the vast number of Moplah rebels were illiterates, the leadership consisted of men with a trace of education.

The District Magistrate and the Police Chief faced the threat of assasination. Ali Musseliar had said pubically that he wanted both men dead. The immediate aftermath of the defeat of the rebels in the engagement at Pookattor was a change in tactic on the part of the rebels. They broke into smaller groups and took refuge in the hills surrounding Malabar. As the rebels began threatening Calicut, the Madras Government requested naval assistance as troops still could not be found to deal with the insurgency. On August 23rd 1921, the Comus a battle ship was sent from Colombo and it arrived at Calicut Port on 25th August 1921. The naval ratings engaged the rebels near the Beypore River and a path cleared for the Administration to move to Shoranur. Calicut was defended with a small contingent of Leinsters, a lightly armed group.

The arrival of the Ship was the first step towards a change in strategy. After the defeat of the rebels led by Ali Mussiliar on 31 st September when the Tirurangadi Mosque was captured, it became imperative that the rbels be brought to justice for the killings that they had committed and so a Military Tribunal was constituted in September 1921 to try the rebels for acts of violence murder and dacoity committed by them. The official Report states "rebels terrorized the whole Hindu population and were guilty of many terrible atrocities and crimes, including murder, rapes. dacoity and forcible conversion to Mohammadanism". Just as the situation was reurning to normal in September 1921, Gandhi once again declared his intention to visit Malabar with the sole intention of course of adding fuel to a fire that was getting out of control. The Government stated quite blandly that if he attempted he would be arrested and put behind bars. The Defence of India Act was still in force and the Government could have used the Act in good measure.

Only towards the end of October 1921 was the Government able to find troops to deal with the Moplah Rebellion. Gurkhas, Karens and Burmese battalions were sent' Thre companies of Burmese, Karens and Chin Burmese troops were despatched. And once these batle hardened troops came the tide started turning. Rebels started surrendering though a few fanatical men held out till June 1922. By Febuary 1922 the Moplah Rebellion had been crushed and Malabar was free of the spectre of violence.